We use the 2009/10 National Sample Survey data to describe patterns of seeking, rationing, and participation in India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). At the national level, we find that the self-targeting design of MGNREGS leads to greater rates of self-selection into the program by poorer and scheduled tribe or scheduled caste households. However, the administrative rationing of MGNREGS jobs is not pro-poor but, rather, exhibits a sort of middle-class bias. At the state level, roughly half of 27 states exhibit rationing and participation profiles that signal effective pro-poor targeting. The other half of India's states struggle to avoid high rates and regressive patterns of administrative rationing of MGNREGS jobs to which the poor have a legal right. Our results suggest that MGNREGS can be effectively deployed to attract, employ and improve the well-being of poor rural households but there remains room for improvement and perhaps much to be learned from indepth comparative analysis of MGNREGS program implementation across states.
Introduction
India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), started in 2006, is the largest public works employment project in the world. 1 In the 2010-2011 fiscal year, MGNREGS employed 55 million households who put in 2.5 billion work days on 5.1 million projects, financed by a budget of Rs394 billion (roughly US$7 billion) (http://nrega.nic.in/).The 2005 Act that created MGNREGS grants each rural household a legal right to employment of up to 100 days per year in public works projects at a state-specific minimum wage rate. The program is administered by state and local governments, which also contribute a small share of the variable costs of employment.
Rural poverty reduction is an explicit objective of the MGNREGS. While there are multiple hypothesized mechanisms through which guaranteed employment in public works schemes at a minimum wage might reduce poverty -e.g., by boosting labor demand at the minimum wage so as to induce market-based informal enforcement of the gender-equitable minimum wage on private employers, by investing in productivity-enhancing public goods such as roads, water points, by providing a safety net that might encourage increased investment in higher-risk, higher-return livelihoods, etc. -MGNREGS' most direct poverty reduction pathway is through boosting employment and income for the poor. How effectively this direct transfer mechanism reduces poverty turns fundamentally on the degree to which MGNREGS targets its resources towards otherwise-poor households.
In this paper we explore the degree to which MGNREGS targeting is pro-poor, both at national scale and at the level of individual states.
2 Using nationally-representative data from the National Sample Survey (NSS), we study which households seek MGNREGS work, which of those households are denied MGNREGS employment (i.e., administratively 'rationed') despite their legal right to work under the 2005 Act, and the resulting participation profile across the household per capita expenditure distribution, which is the joint product of households' selfselection into MGNREGS job seeking and administrators' rationing of work. We find that while, overall, MGNREGS does seem to target the rural poor reasonably effectively, there is striking heterogeneity across states, not just in rates of rationing and participation, as Dutta et al. (2012) have already demonstrated, but also in the progressivity or regressivity of the rationing and participation profiles. The interstate differences highlight the potential to improve performance by extracting lessons from states with exemplary pro-poor targeting performance, of which there are several, and applying those findings to states where targeting toward the poor could improve.
The basic economic logic of self-targeting employment guarantee schemes is that the households who are most likely to seek MGNREGS employment are those otherwise unemployed, or whose self-employment or market wage options would yield less than the program's minimum wage,
i.e., the poor. The demand-driven nature of MGNREGS is one of its many appeals as this selfselection is expected to generate a pro-poor (i.e., "progressive") participation profile.
The self-targeting feature can break down for any of multiple reasons, however, and the track record of self-targeting employment guarantee schemes is mixed (Barrett and Clay 2003, Coady et al. 2004 (Bhatia and Drèze 2006) . Several analyses of data from a few districts and states find significant benefits accruing to women (Jandu 2008 , Khera and Nayak 2009 , Pankaj and Tankja 2010 , Azam 2011 ), or to scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribe (ST) households (Drèze and Khera 2009 ), mainly from increased labor market participation due to MGNREGS. But as summarized by Sjoblom and Farrington (2008) , overall assessments of MGNREGS targeting "present a mixed picture" (page 3). Dutta et al. (2012) provide the first nationwide evidence on MGNREGS performance; this paper picks up where they leave off, probing more deeply into the progressivity of rationing and participation and the interstate heterogeneity in pro-poor targeting of MGNREGS.
National MGNREGS targeting performance
The data we analyze come from the 66 th round of the National Sample Survey (NSS66, While the state level aggregates and averages reported in Table 1 and Dutta et al. (2012) are informative, these necessarily mask the distributional implications of MGNREGS participation.
In order to explore that targeting and rationing of MGNREGS at higher resolution, we use nonparametric, kernel-weighted, local polynomial smoothing to estimate and plot the probability of MGNREGS job-seeking, participation, and rationing conditional on per capita expenditure.
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Because the NSS expenditure data we use cover the same period as do the NSS MGNREGS participation data, however, these expenditures necessarily reflect earnings from MGNREGS participation. Assuming that poorer households work more under MGNREGS than richer 4 The procedure we use is the "lpoly" in Stata 12 SE with default optimal bandwidth. We also consider the relationship with landholdings, as an alternative indicator of rural households' well-being. Appendix Figures A1a and A1b plot kernel densities of the logarithm of per capita monthly expenditure and per capita landholdings, respectively. Per capita expenditure exhibit a single mode at 906 Rupees (Rs.) while landholdings were bimodally distributed with the modes being 0.004 hectares (HA) and 0.170 HA. Landholdings here refers to the total amount of land owned, rented, or obtained through other channels reduced by the amount of land rented out. Landholdings are highly correlated with the amount of land owned (correlation coefficient = 0.93). Appendix Figure A2 shows the relationship between landholding and land owned using kernel-weighted smoothing. Landholding (versus land owned) has a slightly flatter slope than the 45 degree line, simply reflecting that households that own less land tend to rent in and those own more land tend to rent out. The plot of expenditure versus landholdings in Appendix Figure A3 exhibits a statistically significant upward-sloping curve, suggesting a strong positive correlation between expenditures and landholdings. Hence our focus on per capita household expenditures hereafter.
households do, we will underestimate targeting effectiveness because participants move up the per capita expenditure distribution relative to the unobserved counterfactual. With that important caveat, the resulting regressions offer a clear visual depiction of the targeting performance of MGNREGS. We also explore whether targeting and rationing differ across different social groups by estimating the conditional probabilities for households differentiated based on their scheduled tribe (ST) or scheduled caste (SC) status and on the gender of the household head.
The ideal would be that participation rates are high for the poor, declining to zero among the non-poor. A more realistic pattern of pro-poor targeting would exhibit a clear negative relation between participation and a household's per capita expenditure level. In contrast, a scheme that fails to target the poor effectively would exhibit an upward-sloping participation profile, indicating lower participation by poorer households relative to better-off ones.
Because participation rates are jointly determined by households' self-selection into the program, reflected in MGNREGS job-seeking, and by rationing among those seeking MGNREGS employment, in order to understand the participation profile it is essential to decompose participation into those two components as well. Participation may be low among the poor for any of a host of reasons: because few poor households know of their newfound right to MGNREGS employment, because they are discouraged from applying by officials or neighbors, or because the opportunity cost of their time is too high in spite of their poverty (Barrett and Clay 2003, Dutta et al. 2012) . The job-seeking profile reflects self-selection into MGNREGS. Much of the job-seeking profile necessarily falls beyond the control of the state in its administration of
MGNREGS.
The rationing profile is of perhaps greater interest because the progressivity of rationing of MGNREGS jobs reflects strongly on program administration, in particular on its orientation toward using MGNREGS to fight rural poverty. Because participation is determined locally, there may be considerable variation among states in rationing profiles and thus in the progressivity of MGNREGS as implemented. Progressively rationed MGNREGS employment would exhibit a pattern wherein rationing is low (ideally, zero) among the poor and rising to a high level at some point beyond the poverty line, perhaps even to 100% if MGNREGS is intended only to benefit the poor and near-poor. Conversely, regressive patterns of MGNREGS administration will be reflected in a downward-sloping relationship between rationing and per capita household expenditures, with the poor more likely than their better-off neighbors to be denied requested employment.
Four main findings emerge from the pooled national data. First, the self-targeting design of MGNREGS indeed leads to greater rates of self-selection into the program by poorer and disadvantaged (ST/SC) households. Second, rationing of MGNREGS jobs is not pro-poor but, rather, exhibits a sort of middle-class bias as households near the poverty line are more likely to receive MGNREGS jobs they seek than are poorer households and, especially, relative to the upper range of the expenditure distribution. Third, because the self-selection effects dominate the rationing effects, the net result is that MGNREGS targeting is noticeably pro-poor and especially favors ST/SC households. Fourth, however, MGNREGS fares less well in reaching poor femaleheaded households, due both to self-selection and rationing effects. per capita monthly expenditure lower than Rs. 150 or higher than Rs. 8000 (which together account for the extreme 0.25% of the whole sample), yielding a trimmed sample size of 58,590
households. The elimination of these outliers allows us to focus on the data with enough density where the conditional probability can be precisely estimated and where the likelihood of measurement error is perhaps less.
Although it is far from perfect targeting, the participation profile in Figure 1 is distinctly downward sloping, indicating clearly pro-poor MGNREGS targeting at national scale. The jobseeking curve runs almost parallel to the participation curve, consistent with the self-selection mechanism that is intended to guide the progressivity of MGNREGS participation: poorer households were substantially more likely to seek MGNREGS work.
The rationing rate was rather high, however, decreasing slightly -but statistically significantlyfor the poorer households before becoming more sharply upward sloping after per capita monthly expenditures of around Rs 1100, which is about 60% higher than the all-India rural poverty line. 5 This indicates that, at national scale, administrative rationing undoes part of MGNREGS' progressivity that arises due to its self-targeting design. The best off households are actively rationed out of the program, to be sure, but the poorest households are also relatively more likely to be denied employment when they request it than are those in the middle of the per capita expenditure distribution. There thus appears a decided middle class bias in MGNREGS job rationing as implemented, on average, across India.
Figures 2-4 plot the conditional probabilities of MGNREGS job seeking, participation and rationing on per capita household expenditures, for female-headed and male-headed households separately. MGNREGS offers equal wage rates to women and men for the same work and makes payment directly to the individual workers. In principle this should lead to greater gender equity, especially because women face lower wages and worse employment prospects in the private labor market in India. But as shown in Figure 2 , although both curves are downward sloping (in line with the self-selection mechanism of MGNREGS), male-headed households are much more likely than female-headed households to seek MGNREGS employment, regardless of expenditure level. The difference is statistically significant over much of the range, especially among households below the poverty line. This is consistent both with the notion that femaleheaded households, especially poor ones, may be more labor-constrained than male-headed households (Barrett and Clay 2003) and that there may be socio-cultural pressures that discourage female-headed households from seeking MGNREGS employment at the same rate as otherwise-identical male-headed households. This result raises a different issue of genderspecific effects of MGNREGS, compared with the findings of Azam (2011) and Imbert and Papp (2011) , using earlier NSS rounds and different methods, that MGNREGS has a sharper impact on female labor force participation than that of males.
As Figure 3 shows, MGNREGS job rationing is more common among poor female-headed households than poor male-headed ones, while that ordering reverses for better off households, among whom rationing is more common among those with male heads. The U-shaped rationing profile -suggestive of a middle-class bias in awarding MGNREGS employment -is decidedly more pronounced among female-headed households than among male-headed households.
The net result, shown in Figure 4 , is that poor male-headed households are statistically significantly more likely to participate in MGNREGS than are poor female-headed households.
That ordering reverses, however, as one moves beyond the median and into the upper quantiles of the expenditure distribution, where female-headed households are as likely as or more likely than male-headed households to participate in MGNREGS. Among female-headed households, there is no statistically significant variation in the probability of participation for those below the poverty line, so MGNREGS is not preferentially targeted at the extreme poor among femaleheaded households. In general, the MGNREGS participation profile is more steeply sloped among male-headed households than female-headed ones, indicating greater progressivity in targeting among the former, partly due to differences in self-selection patterns, partly due to differences in job rationing profiles.
Figures 5-7 plot the conditional probabilities of the three targeting indicators for households belong to scheduled tribe/caste (ST/SC) and for those belong to other castes, replicating the preceding gender-differentiated analysis now for ST/SC status. A first interesting observation is that, compared to other households, ST/SC households were statistically significantly more likely to seek and participate in MGNREGS work and significantly less likely to be rationed out of desired MGNREGS employment. The higher likelihood of job-seeking may reflect fewer and less desirable alternative employment opportunities faced by ST/SC households. As implemented by state and local governments, MGNREGS clearly delivers on its promise to ST/SC households of helping to overcome caste-related labor market disadvantage, rationing them out of MGNREGS jobs with far lower frequency, thereby leading to a much higher participation rate among ST/SC households, almost twice that of the non-ST/SC counterparts.
Interstate variation
The national-level patterns are interesting and important. But since rationing of MGNREGS employment appears to undermine some of the pro-poor self-targeting feature of the program's design, it is especially useful to disaggregate further, to look at variation in these patterns across states. The results are especially illuminating in that they identify a large number of states where MGNREGS appears to serve the poor extremely effectively, as manifest in sharply progressive rationing and participation profiles. At the same time, the data also reveal a number of states that exhibit rather poor MGNREGS targeting performance. More intensive case study examination of differences in MGNREGS implementation among some of these states could usefully inform program refinements, although such analysis lies beyond the scope of this paper.
In order to explore interstate variation in MGNREGS targeting performance, we replicated the preceding exercise from section 2 for each of the 27 states listed in Table 1 Each direction of deviation from the desired pattern carries different implications for policy correctives. Limited participation by the poor due to low rates of MGNREGS job seeking could reflect any of a variety of problems: for example, limited awareness of the right to work and of corresponding MGNREGS job opportunities, sociocultural pressures that discourage the poor from applying for jobs to which they know they are entitled, administrative impediments (e.g., physical access) to applying for MGNREGS employment, job requirements (e.g., the intensity, location or timing of physical labor) that effectively ration out some of the poor, or labor supply constraints (e.g., due to disability or illness) that make an employment guarantee an inappropriate instrument for addressing particular households' poverty status. It is also possible that the existence of other work-based, anti-poverty programs (e.g., the preexisting and similar Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme) has made MGNREGS less attractive. 6 High rates of rationing among the poor -and especially regressive rationing that favors better-off MGNREGS job applicants over poorer ones -clearly reflect administrative failures to use the employment guarantee to relieve rural poverty. The specific problems -elite capture, spatial mismatch, inappropriate job requirements, lack of political interest, administrative incapability, etc. (Khera 2011) -will necessarily vary from district to district and are thus not amenable to analysis using statistical surveys only. But survey evidence of the sort we present can effectively target states for more in-depth, qualitative investigation.
Based on these criteria, we identify five states as exemplary pro-poor targeting states: Manipur, Mizoram, Rajasthan, Sikkim, and Tripura. As an example of the profile exhibited by a state with pro-poor MGNREGS targeting performance, Figure 8 shows the estimated probabilities of each of the three targeting indicators conditional on expenditure for Mizoram. The poor overwhelming seek to participate in MGNREGS; over the lower half of the expenditure distribution, more than 80% of households indicated they sought MGNREGS jobs. The percentage of households rationed out of MGNREGS jobs was close to zero for poor households and statistically significantly increasing in household per capita expenditures. The joint product of high rates of self-selection into the program by the poor and low rates of administrative rationing, the MGNREGS participation profile is exemplary: above 80% for households with monthly per capita expenditure lower than 1200 rupees and significantly decreasing in per capita 6 In Maharashtra, the preexisting EGS generated more mandays of work than the MGNREGS for each fiscal year from 2006 -2007 to 2010 (Vijapurkar 2011 expenditures, pointing to quite effective pro-poor targeting. The patterns for the other four states in this category were very similar.
7
We then identify eight states -Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh, Meghalay, Nagaland, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal -that deviated from exemplary pro-poor targeting only by having lower participation rates among the poor due to relatively high rates of self-selection out of MGNREGS. In these states, rationing of MGNREGS jobs is low among the poor and steeply progressive, indicating that the administrative implementation of MGNREGS is pro-poor even if the impacts on the poor are somewhat limited by lower rates of MGNREGS job seeking by poorer households. Figure 9 shows the targeting performance of Andhra Pradesh as an example. The participation curve shows clear pro-poor targeting and low and progressive rationing of MGNREGS jobs. However, the participation rate was lower than that in the first group of states because a far lower share of poor households seeks MGNREGS employment. Where in Mizoram, the estimated probability of a household seeking MGNREGS employment is at least 80 percent through the 70 th percentile of the state expenditure distribution, in Andhra Pradesh, not even the poorest households exhibit a 75 percent likelihood of seeking MGNREGS jobs and far fewer than half do at the poverty line. As a result, participation among the poor is far lower in this group of eight states than in the first group of five states. For example, the participation rate for households with monthly per capita expenditure lower than Rs. 1000 was 41% in Andhra Pradesh, compared with 98% in Mizoram.
We emphasize again that self-selection can reflect any of a host of factors, some of which could perhaps be adjusted by improved program implementation. That is why we distinguish this group of states from the smaller group with exemplary pro-poor MGNREGS targeting performance. But without any capacity to identify why poor households self-select out of MGNREGS participation, we can only judge targeting performance by the level and progressivity of MGNREGS job rationing and the broader participation profiles, all of which point to solid performance among this set of states.
The remaining 14 states have more than one deviation from the desired pro-poor targeting characteristics, as summarized in Table 2 . Among them, 11 states had low participation rates accompanied with high rationing among the poor (Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharastra, Orissa, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh). In Figure 10 we display the estimated targeting profiles for Orissa as an example of the patterns that characterize this group.
Although the figure indicates pro-poor targeting, as manifest in a progressive (i.e., upwardsloping) rationing profile, the MGNREGS participation rate was below 40% even for the poorest and half or more of all households seeking MGNREGS employment in the state were denied work, even among the poorest. MGNREGS jobs is statistically significantly higher among the poor than among the better off, and the participation rate was below 50% for all expenditure levels.
The final two states, Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashimir, deviated from pro-poor targeting in all the three directions. Figure 12 shows the case of Arunachal Pradesh. The participation rate was below 20% and well below the rationing rate across the whole population.
The participation curve is almost flat and slightly upward sloping for the poor component of the population, point to a non-pro-poor targeting. The rationing curve is downward sloping for the poor with the rate higher than 60% for the poorest. Even the self-targeting feature of MGNREGS seems to fail in these two states, as there is no statistically significant variation in the likelihood of MGNREGS job seeking across the expenditure distribution. In these states, MGNREGS is clearly not performing as intended.
Conclusions
The sheer scale of India's MGNREGS program naturally attracts considerable national and international attention to its performance in targeting the rural poor. 
